Impermissible Altruism: A Response to Pummer.

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Bibliographic Details
Title: Impermissible Altruism: A Response to Pummer.
Authors: Fileva, Iskra
Source: Ethics. Oct2024, Vol. 135 Issue 1, p151-165. 15p.
Subjects: Altruism, Plausibility (Logic), Conduct of life, Charitable giving, Ignorance (Theory of knowledge)
Abstract: I raise three problems for Pummer's account of impermissible yet praiseworthy actions. First, Pummer does not offer a plausible account of the motives of his agents, and this presents a major obstacle to evaluating those agents' conduct. Second, the success of his argument hinges on a problematic way of individuating actions. Finally, there is a better candidate for a type of action that is both praiseworthy and impermissible, but this candidate presents novel challenges for Pummer's account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Database: Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection
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Abstract:I raise three problems for Pummer's account of impermissible yet praiseworthy actions. First, Pummer does not offer a plausible account of the motives of his agents, and this presents a major obstacle to evaluating those agents' conduct. Second, the success of his argument hinges on a problematic way of individuating actions. Finally, there is a better candidate for a type of action that is both praiseworthy and impermissible, but this candidate presents novel challenges for Pummer's account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:00141704
DOI:10.1086/731423