Self-Bias and Self-Related Mentalizing are Unaltered in Adolescents with Autism.
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| Title: | Self-Bias and Self-Related Mentalizing are Unaltered in Adolescents with Autism. |
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| Authors: | Amodeo, Letizia (AUTHOR), Nijhof, Annabel D. (AUTHOR), Williams, David M. (AUTHOR), Wiersema, Jan R. (AUTHOR) |
| Source: | Journal of Autism & Developmental Disorders. Jun2026, Vol. 56 Issue 6, p2339-2353. 15p. |
| Subjects: | Treatment of autism, Mentalization, Psychotherapy, Repeated measures design, Prompts (Psychology), Research funding, Autism, Descriptive statistics, Theory of mind, Analysis of variance, Asperger's syndrome, Data analysis software, Self-perception, Adolescence |
| Abstract: | Purpose: The self is a multidimensional concept that can be represented at a pre-reflective (first-order) level, at a deeper, reflective level (second-order), or even at a meta-level (representing one's own thoughts, i.e. self-related mentalizing). Since self-related processing and mentalizing are crucial for social cognition, both constructs have been researched in individuals with autism, who experience persistent socio-communicative difficulties. Some studies suggested autism-related reductions of the self-bias, i.e. tendency to preferentially process self-related content; while others observed a decreased ability to mentalize on one's own thoughts in autism. However, prior research examined distinct levels of self-related processing in isolation, in the context of separate studies. Methods: In this investigation, we directly compared self-bias, self- and other-related mentalizing within the same sample of adolescents with and without autism, to identify which of these are altered in this condition. Thirty adolescents with autism and 26 age- and IQ-matched controls performed a visual search task (first-order self-bias), a trait adjectives task (second-order self-bias), a feeling-of-knowing task (self-related mentalizing) and the Frith-Happé animations task (other-related mentalizing). Parents also completed two questionnaires (i.e. SRS, SCQ) assessing the adolescent's degree of autism traits. Results: Our findings replicated previous research showing reduced other-related mentalizing in autism. However, we did not find any difference between adolescents with and without autism in terms of first- or second-order self-bias, nor in the ability to mentalize on one's own thoughts. Conclusion: In line with recent investigations, our results do not support earlier claims of altered self-related information processing in autism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| Database: | Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection |
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| Abstract: | Purpose: The self is a multidimensional concept that can be represented at a pre-reflective (first-order) level, at a deeper, reflective level (second-order), or even at a meta-level (representing one's own thoughts, i.e. self-related mentalizing). Since self-related processing and mentalizing are crucial for social cognition, both constructs have been researched in individuals with autism, who experience persistent socio-communicative difficulties. Some studies suggested autism-related reductions of the self-bias, i.e. tendency to preferentially process self-related content; while others observed a decreased ability to mentalize on one's own thoughts in autism. However, prior research examined distinct levels of self-related processing in isolation, in the context of separate studies. Methods: In this investigation, we directly compared self-bias, self- and other-related mentalizing within the same sample of adolescents with and without autism, to identify which of these are altered in this condition. Thirty adolescents with autism and 26 age- and IQ-matched controls performed a visual search task (first-order self-bias), a trait adjectives task (second-order self-bias), a feeling-of-knowing task (self-related mentalizing) and the Frith-Happé animations task (other-related mentalizing). Parents also completed two questionnaires (i.e. SRS, SCQ) assessing the adolescent's degree of autism traits. Results: Our findings replicated previous research showing reduced other-related mentalizing in autism. However, we did not find any difference between adolescents with and without autism in terms of first- or second-order self-bias, nor in the ability to mentalize on one's own thoughts. Conclusion: In line with recent investigations, our results do not support earlier claims of altered self-related information processing in autism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| ISSN: | 01623257 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10803-024-06705-8 |
