IS NEUROSCIENCE ADEQUATE AS THE FORTHCOMING "MINDSCIENCE"?

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Bibliographic Details
Title:	IS NEUROSCIENCE ADEQUATE AS THE FORTHCOMING "MINDSCIENCE"?
Authors:	Manzotti, Riccardo, Moderato, Paolo
Source:	Behavior & Philosophy. 2010, Vol. 38, p1-29. 29p.
Subjects:	Brain, Radiography, Neurosciences, Mind & body, Logical positivism, Materialism
Abstract:	The widespread use of brain imaging techniques encourages conceiving of neuroscience as the forthcoming ''mindscience.'' Perhaps surprisingly for many, this conclusion is still largely unwarranted. The present paper surveys various shortcomings of neuroscience as a putative ''mindscience.'' The analysis shows that the scope of mind (both cognitive and phenomenal) falls outside that of neuroscience. Of course, such a conclusion does not endorse any metaphysical or antiscientific stance as to the nature of the mind. Rather, it challenges a series of assumptions that the undeniable success of neuroscience has fostered. In fact, physicalism is here taken as the only viable ontological framework--an assumption that does not imply that the central nervous system exhausts the physical domain. There are other options like behavior, embodiment, situatedness, and externalism that are worth considering. Likewise, neuroscience is not the only available epistemic option as to the understanding of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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Database:	Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection

Description
Abstract:	The widespread use of brain imaging techniques encourages conceiving of neuroscience as the forthcoming ''mindscience.'' Perhaps surprisingly for many, this conclusion is still largely unwarranted. The present paper surveys various shortcomings of neuroscience as a putative ''mindscience.'' The analysis shows that the scope of mind (both cognitive and phenomenal) falls outside that of neuroscience. Of course, such a conclusion does not endorse any metaphysical or antiscientific stance as to the nature of the mind. Rather, it challenges a series of assumptions that the undeniable success of neuroscience has fostered. In fact, physicalism is here taken as the only viable ontological framework--an assumption that does not imply that the central nervous system exhausts the physical domain. There are other options like behavior, embodiment, situatedness, and externalism that are worth considering. Likewise, neuroscience is not the only available epistemic option as to the understanding of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:	10538348