La 'paz total' de Petro: ¿una política pública fracasada? Evaluando la estrategia de negociación y los resultados de la política de paz en Colombia (2022-2026).

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Bibliographic Details
Title:	La 'paz total' de Petro: ¿una política pública fracasada? Evaluando la estrategia de negociación y los resultados de la política de paz en Colombia (2022-2026). (Spanish).
Alternate Title:	Petro's "Total Peace": A Failed Public Policy? Assessing the Negotiation Strategy and Outcomes of Colombia's Peace Policy (2022-2026). (English)
Authors:	Durán S. J., Mauricio García
Source:	Controversia (01204165). ene-jun2026, Issue 226, p2-51. 50p.
Subjects:	Peace negotiations, Policy analysis, Negotiation, Conflict management, War, Politicians
Geographic Terms:	Colombia
Abstract (English):	This article critically examines the "Total Peace" policy implemented during Gustavo Petro's administration (2022-2026) in order to assess whether it can be considered a failed public policy. The study analyzes the evolution and outcomes of the multiple dialogues and negotiations conducted with guerrilla organizations, dissident groups, post-paramilitary structures, and urban criminal organizations, which ultimately became the core of the government's peace strategy. Drawing on both Colombian and international experiences in peace processes, the author identifies ten key components of successful peace negotiations and integrates them into an analytical framework based on four dimensions: strategic clarity, negotiation methodology, security and control of illegal economies, and the participation of third parties and civil society. Using this framework, the article evaluates the implementation of Petro's peace policy and finds significant shortcomings in the definition of objectives, the characterization of armed actors, the establishment of appropriate legal frameworks, the articulation between negotiation and security policies, and the achievement of sustainable agreements. The study concludes that "Total Peace" evolved into a set of fragmented dialogues with limited outcomes, failing to produce substantial transformations in the dynamics of armed conflict or broad peace agreements. Although some territorial processes achieved partial progress, the policy ultimately resulted in a "partial peace" of a smaller scope than previous peace negotiations in Colombia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Abstract (Spanish):	Este artículo analiza críticamente la política de ‘paz total’ implementada durante el gobierno de Gustavo Petro (2022-2026), con el propósito de determinar si puede considerarse una política pública fracasada. Para ello, examina la evolución y los resultados de los múltiples diálogos y negociaciones adelantados con guerrillas, disidencias, grupos posparamilitares y organizaciones criminales urbanas, que terminaron constituyéndose en el eje central de la estrategia gubernamental. A partir de la experiencia acumulada en procesos de paz nacionales e internacionales, el autor identifica diez componentes fundamentales para el éxito de una negociación de paz y los articula en un modelo analítico compuesto por cuatro dimensiones: claridad estratégica, metodología de negociación, seguridad y control de economías ilegales, y participación de terceros y sociedad civil. Con base en este marco, se evalúa la implementación de la política de paz del gobierno Petro, encontrando deficiencias en la definición de objetivos, el reconocimiento de la naturaleza de los actores armados, la construcción de marcos jurídicos adecuados, la articulación entre negociación y seguridad, y la consolidación de acuerdos sostenibles. El estudio concluye que la 'paz total' derivó en una serie de diálogos fragmentados y resultados limitados, sin alcanzar transformaciones significativas en la dinámica del conflicto armado ni acuerdos de paz de amplio alcance. Aunque algunos procesos territoriales muestran avances, la política terminó produciendo una "paz parcial", de menor magnitud que experiencias previas de negociación en Colombia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Database:	Referencia Latina

Description
Abstract:	This article critically examines the "Total Peace" policy implemented during Gustavo Petro's administration (2022-2026) in order to assess whether it can be considered a failed public policy. The study analyzes the evolution and outcomes of the multiple dialogues and negotiations conducted with guerrilla organizations, dissident groups, post-paramilitary structures, and urban criminal organizations, which ultimately became the core of the government's peace strategy. Drawing on both Colombian and international experiences in peace processes, the author identifies ten key components of successful peace negotiations and integrates them into an analytical framework based on four dimensions: strategic clarity, negotiation methodology, security and control of illegal economies, and the participation of third parties and civil society. Using this framework, the article evaluates the implementation of Petro's peace policy and finds significant shortcomings in the definition of objectives, the characterization of armed actors, the establishment of appropriate legal frameworks, the articulation between negotiation and security policies, and the achievement of sustainable agreements. The study concludes that "Total Peace" evolved into a set of fragmented dialogues with limited outcomes, failing to produce substantial transformations in the dynamics of armed conflict or broad peace agreements. Although some territorial processes achieved partial progress, the policy ultimately resulted in a "partial peace" of a smaller scope than previous peace negotiations in Colombia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
ISSN:	01204165
DOI:	10.54118/controver.vi226.1443