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Efficiency and the core in NTU games in partition function form.

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Title: Efficiency and the core in NTU games in partition function form.
Authors: Bimonte, Giovanna1 (AUTHOR) gbimonte@unisa.it, Senatore, Luigi1 (AUTHOR) lsenatore@unisa.it, Tramontano, Salvatore2 (AUTHOR) stramontano@unisa.it
Source: Annals of Operations Research. Jan2026, Vol. 356 Issue 1, p123-134. 12p.
Subjects: Partition functions, Externalities, Mathematical optimization, Game theory
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core in NTU games in partition function form, given an externality scheme f ∈ Ex (N) . We extend the notion of convexity to incorporate externality effects. By introducing a new concept of rationality, called collective rationality, we demonstrate the efficiency of the grand coalition N. We also identify a sufficient condition for the efficiency of the grand coalition using the property of individual superadditivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Copyright of Annals of Operations Research is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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  Data: Efficiency and the core in NTU games in partition function form.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Bimonte%2C+Giovanna%22">Bimonte, Giovanna</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> gbimonte@unisa.it</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Senatore%2C+Luigi%22">Senatore, Luigi</searchLink><relatesTo>1</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> lsenatore@unisa.it</i><br /><searchLink fieldCode="AR" term="%22Tramontano%2C+Salvatore%22">Tramontano, Salvatore</searchLink><relatesTo>2</relatesTo> (AUTHOR)<i> stramontano@unisa.it</i>
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="JN" term="%22Annals+of+Operations+Research%22">Annals of Operations Research</searchLink>. Jan2026, Vol. 356 Issue 1, p123-134. 12p.
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  Data: <searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Partition+functions%22">Partition functions</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Externalities%22">Externalities</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Mathematical+optimization%22">Mathematical optimization</searchLink><br /><searchLink fieldCode="DE" term="%22Game+theory%22">Game theory</searchLink>
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  Label: Abstract
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  Data: The aim of this paper is to establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core in NTU games in partition function form, given an externality scheme f ∈ Ex (N) . We extend the notion of convexity to incorporate externality effects. By introducing a new concept of rationality, called collective rationality, we demonstrate the efficiency of the grand coalition N. We also identify a sufficient condition for the efficiency of the grand coalition using the property of individual superadditivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
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  Data: <i>Copyright of Annals of Operations Research is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.</i> (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
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        Value: 10.1007/s10479-024-06192-1
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        Text: English
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      – SubjectFull: Mathematical optimization
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      – SubjectFull: Game theory
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      – TitleFull: Efficiency and the core in NTU games in partition function form.
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